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I. INTRODUCTION
For Professor Kinney, the idea of a human right to health care was a matter
of central and continuing interest.' Rather like a gemologist, Professor Kinney
examined the facets2 of this right with discerning attention. This contribution
continues the conversation with Professor Kinney at fundamental levels.3
Professor Kinney distinguished, in particular, a human right4 from a natural
right;' international human rights6 from other sorts of human rights;' and a right
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School
of Law. A more extensively documented version of this contribution can be found at the author's
SSRN page.
1. See, e.g., Jason T. Eberl, Eleanor D. Kinney & Matthew J. Williams, Foundation For a
Natural Right to Health Care, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 537 (2011) [hereinafter Foundation]; Eleanor D.
Kinney, Health Care Financing and Delivery in the US, Mexico and Canada: Finding and
Establishing Intentional Principles For Sound Integration, 26 Wis. INT'L L.J. 934 (2009)
[hereinafter Health Care Financing]; Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Human Right to Health:
What Does This Mean For Our Nation and World?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1457 (2001) [hereinafter
International]; Eleanor D. Kinney & Brian Alexander Clark, Provisions For Health and Health
Care in the Constitutions of The Countries of the World, 37 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 285 (2004)
[hereinafter Provisions]; Eleanor D. Kinney, Realization of the International Human Right to
Health Care in an Economically Integrated North America, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 807 (2009)
[hereinafter Economically]; Eleanor D. Kinney, Realizing the International Human Right to Health
For Non-Citizens in the United States, 1 NOTRE DAME J. INT'L COMP & HUM. RTs. L. 94, 112
(2011) [hereinafter Non-Citizens] ("[r]ealizing the international human right to health must be
achieved on a global level"); Eleanor D. Kinney, Realizing the International Human Right to
Health: The Challenge of For-Profit Health Care, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 49 (2010) [hereinafter
Challenge]; Eleanor D. Kinney, Recognition of the International Human Right to Health Care in
the United States, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 335 (2008) [hereinafter United States].
2. Note the range of perspectives taken in the authorities cited supra note 1.
3. Thus, our attention is largely confined to the most foundational of Professor Kinney's
concerns, with special attention to Foundation, supra note 1, and with some reference as well to
International, supra note 1; Challenge, supra note 1; and United States, supra note 1.
4. For merely one instance of a focus on 'human' rights without corresponding reference
to 'natural' rights, see International, supra note 1.
5. Much of the focus is explicitly on 'natural' rights, specifically in Foundation, supra note
1.
6. See, e.g., International, supra note 1; Economically, supra note 1.
7. In a sense, any familiar understanding of the idea of a human right implies its
applicability beyond the borders of a single state, and thus international. Otherwise, the point of
referring to a "human," as distinct from, say, a constitutional right within a legal system, would be
unclear. Of course, one might refer to "international" human rights for other purposes, such as to
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to health care as distinct from a right to health itself.9 We briefly address these
and other arguably even more fundamental issues herein.
First, though, we summarize Professor Kinney's explication of the idea of a
human right to health. This summary draws upon several of Professor Kinney's
published works, with primary attention to her jointly authored article entitled
Foundation for a Natural Right to Health Care."
In Foundation, Professor Kinney argues that "a fundamental human right to
health exists in international law 2 and philosophical tradition, and governments
are thus obligated to recognize this right through fair and just implementation."13
Officially adopted language has it that "[h]ealth is a fundamental human right
indispensable for the exercise of other human rights," 4 and that "every human
being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health
conducive to living a life in dignity."" Such language is, however, aspirational,
emphasize questions of the right's embodiment in international treaties, or its fulfillment through
international cooperation. For a mainstream use of the term, "international human rights," see JACK
DONNELLY & DANIEL J. WHELAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (5th ed. 2017).
8. See, e.g., Foundations, supra note 1; Economically, supra note 1; United States, supra
note 1.
9. See International, supra note 1; Non-Citizens, supra note 1; Challenge, supra note 1.
Professor Kinney recognizes a distinction between health care and health itself, as in, e.g., the very
title of Provisions, supra note 1. One might distinguish between health care and health itself and
regard both as a matter of human right, requiring different forms of recognition and compliance.
Some writers have emphasized the differences between health care and health itself and would deny
human right status to the latter. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Human Rights in the Emerging World Order,
1 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 31, 45 (2010) ("[I]t would be silly to think that people really have
a right to be healthy, a right which is violated every time they are not healthy."); Allen E.
Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum ofHealth Care, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 55, 55 (1984) ("I
think its implausibility is obvious.").
10. See in particular the sources cited supra note 3.
11. Foundation, supra note 1.
12. For some of the most directly relevant United Nations Declarations and Covenants, see
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (art. 25 in
particular); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1993, 393
U.N.T.S. 3; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000). For
useful summaries, see Eibe Riedel, The Human Right to Health: Conceptual Foundations, in
REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 21 (Andrew Clapham et al. eds., 2009); Michael Krennerich, The
Human Right to Health: Fundamentals ofa Complex Right, in HEALTHCARE AS A HUMAN RIGHTS
(Sabine Klotz et al. eds., 2017).
13. Foundation, supra note 1, at 553.
14. Id. at 538-39.
15. Id. (quoting Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, supra note 12, ¶ 1). See also Paul
Hunt & Gunilla Backman, Health Systems and the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, in
REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, 40 (Andrew Clapham et al. eds., 2009).
16. Foundation, supra note 1, at 539.
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in the sense that no present society is thought to be in full compliance."
Crucially, if a right to health or to health care is not universally recognized,
or if there is disagreement as to the meaning of the right, it is important to be able
to articulate the most basic and most persuasive justification of the right in
question." Professor Kinney recognizes the diversity of possible basic
justifications for health or health care rights. 9 Apart from appeals to particular
religious doctrines, Professor Kinney notes in particular the possibility of
deontological 20 and even utilitarian2' attempts to justify human rights
jurisprudence.2 2
The focus of Professor Kinney and her colleagues is thus on the idea of a
fundamental justification of a basic human right to health or to health care. One
such possible justification is said by Professor Kinney to draw upon the natural
law tradition, 2 3 both historic 24 and as revised by contemporary theories of basic
human capabilities 25 and self-realization. 26
A natural law approach to justifying human rights claims to health or to
health care should, at a minimum, properly account for the universality of the
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 540.
20. See Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological [https://perma.cc/
7UXC-KRMU].
21. See Julia Driver, The History of Utilitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sept. 22,
2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history [https://perma.cc/6FKC-TTG2]. For
a broader survey of influential schools of normative ethics, see SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE
ETHICS 189-299 (1997); MARCIA W. BARON, PHILIP PETTIT & MICHAEL SLOTE, THREE METHODS
OF ETHICS (1997) (adding aretaic or virtue-based normative ethics to the mix). If familiar forms of
utilitarianism can justify universal human rights, so, one might ethical theories that treat the
cultivation of familiar virtues as central. See RoWN CRUFT ET AL., PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2015).
22. Foundation, supra note 1, at 540.
23. Id. at 538.
24. See id. at 543-47.
25. See id.; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH (2013); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE ch. 2 (2011); Efrat Ram-Tiktin, The Right
to Health Care as a Right to Basic Human Functional Capabilities, 15 ETHICAL THEORY & SOC.
PRAC. 337 (2012).
26. See id. For discussions of self-realization, self-actualization, or self-fulfillment in broader
ethical and political contexts, see, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.
1975) (1859); T.H. GREEN, PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS (1883). See also, DAVID 0. BRINK,
PERFECTIONISM AND THE COMMON GOOD: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF T.H. GREEN (2003);
THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM (1993); Steven Wall, Perfectionism in Moral and Political
Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perfectionism-moral
[https://perma.cc/4BJ7-R63G] (last updated Dec.15, 2017).
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right, across cultures and degrees of economic, scientific, and technological
development.2 7 But that natural law justification should also recognize the ways
in which the right must have a variable and pluralistic dimension, in properly
accommodating differences among cultures and their degrees of economic,
scientific, technical development.2 8
For some purposes, settling upon some specific deep justification for a human
right to health care may not much matter.29 But any putative human right,
certainly including health care, will quickly become controversial along many
substantive fronts.3 0 Some3 ' form of a fundamental justification aspiring to
objectivity3 2 and universality3 3 then becomes indispensable.
A right to health care, whether objectively morally grounded or not, is said
to be fundamental in that it is "indispensable for the exercise of other human
rights."3 4 More broadly, a natural law theorist in particular might defend a right
to some level of health care as conducive not necessarily to the best balance of
pleasure over pain,35 but to promoting the good of person and the transcending
common good.36 Historically, pursuit of a presumed common good has been
central to the natural law tradition, as in Thomas Aquinas.3 7 For Aquinas, bodily
27. See Foundation, supra note 1, at 543.
28. See id.; International, supra note 1, at 1467.
29. See Foundation, supra note 1, at 542 (referring to Mary Ann Glendon's discussion of
Jacques Maritain's report of the diversity of motivating principles underlying international
endorsement of some basic human rights). See also Mary Ann Glendon & Seth D. Kaplan,
Renewing Human Rights, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 2019).
30. See Foundation, supra note 1, at 538-39.
31. Id. at 540 (listing deontological, utilitarian, and natural law approaches to justifying
human rights claims and responsibilities).
32. See id. at 548. See generally LORRAIN DASTON & PETER GALISON, OBJECTIVITY (2007)
(for an account of recent understandings of the idea of objectivity in and beyond the moral realm);
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (For skepticism of the natural law in the
United States jurisprudential context); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV.
40 (1918).
33. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary
Gregor & Jens Timmermann eds., 2d ed. 2012) (1785).
34. Foundation, supra note 1, at 538. By loose analogy, consider the constitutional status of
the right to vote in state elections as preservative of other important rights. See, e.g., Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
561-62 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
35. As in some crude versions of utilitarianism. See Jeremy Betham, The Principles of Morals
and Legislation (Prometheus 1988) (1781).
36. See Foundation, supra note 1, at 542 (citing the modern natural law theorist Jacques
Maritain). See also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 125-54 (Paul Craig ed.,
2d ed. 2011).
37. See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, part I-II, question 90, art. 2, respondio
(Kevin Knight ed. 2017) available at www.newadvent.org/summa/2090.htm
[https://perma.cc/6SHA-Q7KE] ("the law is chiefly ordained to the common good") (linking the
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integrity and bodily health are among the most fundamental of all goods.3 8
How the crucial good of bodily39 health is to be promoted, pursuant to
Thomistic natural law, is then open to a range of interpretations. Aquinas may be
best interpreted as neither incapable of following the logic justifying economic
markets, nor incapable of profound critique of markets.4 0 One striking result is
Aquinas's conclusion that in some cases, desperate needs to sustain minimal
bodily well-being cannot so much override, but fundamentally transform, the
basic laws of individual property.4 ' Neither the classical tradition4 2 nor Professor
exercise of reason, the common good, and promoting ultimate happiness or well-being). From
among a vast critical and expository literature, see, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL,
POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY (1998); THE ETHICS OF AQUINAS (Stephen J. Pope ed. 2002). For
a more modem but related argument, see Daniel M. Hausman, A Lockean Argument for Universal
Access to Health Care, 28 SoC. PHIL. & POL'Y 166, 166 (2011).
38. See AQUINAS, supra note 37, part I-II, question 94, art. 2, respondio (on the most basic
goods to be sought pursuant to the natural law).
39. Aquinas is, of course, concerned here not only with bodily health and integrity, but with
psychological health, and with health of character. See AQUINAS, supra note 37, part I-II, questions
55-66. See also JOHN BUDZISZEWSKI, COMMENTARY ON THOMAS AQUINAS'S VIRTUE ETHICS
(2017).
40. For an exceptionally worthy discussion of Aquinas's appreciation for and fundamental
critique of market operations and outcomes, see generally MARY L. HIRSCHFIELD, AQUINAS AND
THE MARKET: TOWARD A HUMANE ECONOMY (2018). See also, for more contemporary
perspectives, first CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM: WHAT IT IS, How IT WORKS, AND
WHAT TO MAKE OF IT (2001), and then, conflictingly, JASON BRENNAN, WHY NOT CAPITALISM?
(2014); G.A. COHEN, WHYNOT SOCIALISM? (2009); FRIEDRICK A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
(1945); JOHN For a classic instance of what is often mistakenly thought of as an optional private
redistribution of resources, see ST. CARDINAL BONAVENTURE, THE SOUL'S JOURNEY INTO GOD,
THE TREE OF LIFE, AND THE LIFE OF ST. FRANCIS 254 (Paulist Press ed., Ewart Cousins trans.)
(1978) (1263).E. ROEMER, AFUTURE FOR SOCIALISM? (1994); LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN
ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (J. Kahane tras.1962); Friedrick A. Hayek, The Use of
Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON. REV. 519 (1945); Oscar Lange, On the Economic Theory of
Socialism: Part One, 4 REV. ECON. STUD. 53 (1936); Oscar Lange, On the Economic Theory of
Socialism: Part Two, 4 REV. EcON. STUD. 123 (1937); Abba P. Lerner, Economic Theory and
Socialist Economy, 2 REV. EcON. STUD., 51 (1934). For a brief but even-handed account of the
"socialist calculation" debate, see ALLEN BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 109-
17 (1988).
41. See AQUINAS, supra note 37, part 11-11, question 66, art. 7, respondio. See also John
Chrysostom, Discourse II, in On Wealth and Poverty 3 (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press 1999)
(-390). Professor Kinney and her colleagues cite Aquinas's discussion of surplus private property
as genuinely owned by a person with no alternative to meeting their immediate desperate need,
Foundation, supra note 1, at 547.
42. For a classic instance of what is often mistakenly thought of as an optional private
redistribution of resources, see ST. CARDINAL BONAVENTURE, THE SOUL'S JOURNEY INTO GOD,
THE TREE OF LIFE, AND THE LIFE OF ST. FRANCIS 254 (Paulist Press ed., Ewart Cousins trans.)
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Kinney herself assumes, however, that crucial bodily health needs must be met
in all instances by some form of direct govermmental provision.4 3
The traditional natural law concepts of the common good, human flourishing,
and the fullest development of human capacities have recently been taken up in
the 'capabilities' approach of writers such as Martha Nussbaum.44 Professor
Kinney interprets the capabilities approach to individual flourishing45 and the
common good as implying certain basic rights and corresponding obligations.47
Among the most fundamental elements of flourishing is, as Professor Nussbaum
argues,4 8 bodily health.49 This fundamental capability then implies certain
associated rights.
Ultimately, Professor Kinney and her colleagues again recognize an
international near consensus "that a fundamental human right to health exists in
international law and international law and philosophical tradition, and
governments are thus obligated to realize this right through fair and just
implementation.""
This defense of a human right to health care, however, is hardly universally
accepted. Consider in particular the broad critique of human rights theory and
practice of Professor Eric A. Posner." Posner argues that:
[T]he proposition that all people enjoy a specified set of human rights .
. . is highly controversial among philosophers. The absence of an agreed
upon philosophical justification for human rights yields well-known
(1978) (1263).
43. See Challenge, supra note 1, at 59, 64-5. See also Foundation at 553 (ultimately, "a
fundamental human right to health exists in international law and philosophical tradition, and
governments are thus obligated to realize this right through fair and just implementation," but "the
realization of human rights, even the provision of benefits to individuals, does not necessarily
require that government do the providing."). The nature, efficacy, and meaning of health care in
the thirteenth century are in some, but certainly not all, respects different in contemporary health
care systems. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 3-28
(2017 ed.).
44. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH ch. 2 (2013) [hereinafter Creating Capabilities]; Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities and
Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 287 (1997) (referring to "bodily health" as "being able
to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate
shelter"). See also Ram-Tiktin, supra note 25.
45. Foundation, supra note 1, at 550.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See sources cited supra note 44.
49. Creating Capabilities, supra note 44, at 33.
50. Foundation, supra note 1, at 553.
51. See generally Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. Rev.
1758 (2008) [hereinafter Human Welfare]; ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT of HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW (2014).
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practical difficulties: States disagree about which rights are human rights,
about which human rights should have priority, about how resources
should be allocated for the purpose of correcting human rights violations,
and about how much respect should be given to cultural variation.5 2
Below, we continue the conversation with Professor Kinney as to these and other
points.
II. THE DISTINCTIVE FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS IN GENERAL
Professor Kinney understandably seeks to justify claims of a human right to
health care as securely as possible. Her preference, as we have seen,5 3 is for an
updated natural law-based approach. Natural law theories of any sort are at
present not generally favored, even among loosely sympathetic writers.5 4 Almost
every conceivable approach to justifying human rights claims is endorsed
somewhere in the relevant literature." But it seems doubtful that any
metaphysically less ambitious approach to justifying human rights claims can,
over time, supply the motivation for substantial self-sacrifice for the sake of
remote strangers.56
Professor James Griffin in particular has argued that the underlying logic and
justification of human rights claims historically drew crucially upon theology,"
with a familiar later transition toward secularity." But "[w]hen during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the theological content of the idea [of
52. Human Welfare, supra note 51, at 1760 (footnote omitted).
53. See supra Section I.
54. See, e.g., Vittorio Bufacchi, Theoretical Foundations for Human Rights, 66 POL. STUD.
601 (2017) (avoiding a natural law approach in favor of a 'deflationary' theory relying on social
construction and convention).
55. For leading contemporary contributions, see generally CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2013); JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2008); RHODAE. HOWARD-HASSMANN, IN DEFENSE
OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2018); HUMAN RIGHTS FUTURES (Stephen Hopgood et al. eds.,
2017); SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (Harvard Univ.
Press 2018); JAMES NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2007); MICHAEL J. PERRY,
TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: Religion, Law, Courts (2007); PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1996); CARL WELLMAN, THE MORAL
DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010); Bufacchi, supra note 54; Joseph Raz, Human Rights
Without Foundations (Oxford Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 14/2007, 2007),
https://ssrn.com/abstract-999874 [https://perma.cc/A2XL-243L].
56. For a brief discussion, see GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 1-2; see also infra note 123 and
accompanying text.
57. See GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 1.
58. See id. at 1-2.
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human rights] was abandoned, nothing was put in its place."5 9
Over the past century or so, the historic theological realism and then the
succeeding secular realism once thought to validate human rights claims has
increasingly been abandoned in favor of a variety of less ambitious approaches
to justifying human rights, if not to disposing of the project of justification.
Ultimately, the meaning, weight, and bindingness of claims as to human rights
depend upon the metaethics underlying those claims. The less ambitious the
metaethical grounding, the less binding the substantive human rights claim is
likely to be.6 0
Thus, historic forms of moral realism have given way to a continually
splintering variety of less ambitious6 ' metaethical approaches. Among the current
rubrics would be anti-realism, constructivism, some forms of contextualism,
conventionalism, some forms of deflationism, emotivism, reductive and
eliminative materialism, metaethical minimalism, non-cognitivism, pragmatism,
projectivism, quasi-realism,6 2 and moral skepticism, Pyrrhonian6 3 or otherwise.6 4
Contemporary advocates of these variously diluted metaethical views do not
invariably abandon the use of terms such as 'inviolable,' 'inviolability,' or the
'sacred,' that one might well associate with a more ambitious metaethics.6 5
Whether any attenuated metaethics can fully cash the checks written by terms
such as 'inviolability' is doubtful. But the long-term observance of progressive
human rights norms may ultimately depend on just such matters.
The less ambitious approaches to the metaphysics of human rights do have
a long history. Merely for example, consider the classic atoms-and-the-void
59. Id. at 2.
60. But see the implicit argument to the contrary in the arguably misleadingly titled article
by Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996)
(the net value of Professor Dworkin's references to 'objectivity' is limited). See, e.g., Robert D.
Sloane, Human Rights for Hedgehogs?: Global Value Pluralism, International Law, and Some
Reservations of theFox, 90 B.U. L. REv. 975, 989 (2010).
61. Or if technically not less realist, then self-stultifying as justifications for human rights
claims. See generally, e.g., JOHN MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977) (the
"error theory," as well as the non-cognitivist approach).
62. Many of these categories overlap. See generally, e.g., SnIoN BLACKBURN, ESSAYS IN
QUASI-REALISM (1993) (projectivism and quasi-realism).
63. See generally, e.g., PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed. 2004).
64. Nearly all of these rubrics are addressed in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/ [https://perma.cc/
W58E-JXBH]. For more a comprehensive treatment of metaethics, see generally, e.g., ANDREW
FISCHER, METAETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION (2014); SIMON KIRCHIN, METAETHICS (2012); ANDREW
MILLER, CONTEMPORARY METAETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION (2013); MARK VAN ROOJEN,
METAETHICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION (2015). On constructivism and conventionalism
in human rights theory, see generally Bufacchi, supra, note 54.
65. See generally, the relevant writings of Dworkin, supra note 60; RONALD DWORKIN,
RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013).
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metaphysics of the poet Lucretius.6 Lucretius famously adopts a rigorous
materialism of mind, arguing that the building blocks of all things in nature are
called, "according to our needs, matter, atoms, generative bodies, elements and
seeds, and first-beginnings, since it is from these that all proceeds."6 7 More
simply, "the universe's nature consists, in essence, of two different things: for
there is matter, and there is void, in which the particles of matter move hither and
thither."6 8 The mind itself is said by Lucretius to consist entirely of matter, in the
form of minute particles.6 9
The problem is that thinking of the mind as consisting of minute particles,
even at the quantum level, does not seem to leave much room for classic freedom
of the will, for classical moral responsibility,7  or for a genuinely binding
morality of any familiar human rights.72
Hence the current dilemma for advocates, including Professor Kinney, of any
sort of natural law-oriented basis for human rights claims, including a human
right to health care. Contemporary culture tends to view natural law theories of
any political valence as unpersuasive, incredible, or realistically unavailable.7 3
But many of these same critiques of even the most appealing versions of natural
law theory can be readily applied as well to any approach to metaethics that could
66. See LUCRETIUS, THE NATURE OF THINGS (Alicia Stallings trans., Penguin Classics ed.,
2007) (-50 BCE).
67. Id. at 4-5. This thoroughgoing materialism does not, however, prevent Lucretius from
then almost immediately invoking ideas such as impiety, sin, wickedness, wrongfulness, and
defilement. These terms are broadly inconsistent with pure materialism, at least as these ideas are
normally understood. See DWORKIN, supra note 65.
68. LUCRETIUS, supra note 66, at 5 ("[a]nd specifically, 'material makes up the composition
of the mind"'). Id. at 77 (in particular, the mind consists of minute "particles").
69. Id.
70. See e.g., Anthony R. Cashmore, The Lucretian Swerve: The Biological Basis ofHuman
Behavior and the Criminal Justice System, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF Sci. U.S.A. (Jan.
12, 2010), www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0915161107 [https://perma.cc/72CZ-9LUK]. The
"Lucretian Swerve" is drawn from Lucretius, LUCRETIUS, supra note 66, at 77.
71. See BRUCE N. WALLER, AGAINST MORAL RESPONSI1LITY ch. 2 (2011).
72. See, e.g., RICHARD GARNER, BEYOND MORALITY (Temple Univ. Press, 1994); THE END
OF MORALITY: TAKING MORAL ABOLITIONISM SERIOUSLY (Richard Garner & Richard Joyce eds.,
2019); RICHARD JOYCE, THE MYTH OF MORALITY (2007); ALEX ROSENBERG, THE ATHEIST'S
GUIDE TO REALITY: ENJOYING LIFE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS (2011). See generally R. George Wright,
Criminal Law and Sentencing: What Goes With Free Will?, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 1 (2012). There is
a tendency at present to believe that if all versions of morality were universally, consistently, and
deeply rejected, life would be either largely unaffected or else more humane.
73. See MACKIE, supra note 61 (providing a classic statement). See also the authorities cited
supra note 73. It is certainly possible that a thoroughly de-moralized society could make some
provision for the health care of persons, perhaps based on reciprocal altruism, where such a policy
promoted the evolutionary adaptive fitness of health care donors. See generally Robert L. Trivers,
The Evolution Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOL. 35 (1971).
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vindicate, in any meaningful way, human rights in general, or a human right to
health care in particular.
III. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE AND THE CONFLICTING
UNDERSTANDINGS OF FAIR EQUALITY
At a more practical level, but still of fundamental importance, is the question
of the concrete meaning of fairness and equality in the distribution of health care.
As it turns out, the alternative approaches to fairness and equality in health care
rights parallel those that seek to concretely interpret the general idea of equality
itself. Unfortunately, in neither the context of health care access nor in that of the
idea of equality itself have the leading contemporary scholars reached anything
remotely like a consensus.7 4
With some oversimplification, understandings of fairness and equality in the
context of health care rights fall into five largely distinct families. In roughly
descending order of stringency, these five families may be thought of as follows:
First are the approaches to health care rights that we may think of as especially
rigorous and demanding with respect to genuine equality of distribution.7 1 Second
are the approaches that we may refer to as "prioritarian. "76 Third is the family of
approaches referred to as "sufficientarian" in character." Fourth, there is the
family of approaches that ranges, within the category itself, from something like
"decency"7 in provision, to some forms of mere minimalist provision,79 as in a
minimalist focus on public health matters such as sanitation and vaccinations
against contagious diseases. Fifth, and finally, there is the category of what we
might call mere formalism in the provision of health care."
These five contending schools of thought regarding the meaning of fairness
and equality in health care rights track their counterparts in the broader debates
over equality more generally. Writers such as G.A. Cohen" and Philippe van
Parijs82 are sometimes thought of, for example, as relatively stringent egalitarians.
74. See R. George Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea ofEquality, 34 L. & INEQ. 1 (2016).
Linking the idea of equality with avoiding (improper) discrimination, however, carries us only so
far. See George J. Annas & Wendy K. Mariner, (Public) Health and Human Rights in Practice, 41
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 129, 136 (2016).
75. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
79. See id.
80. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY (2008) (a generallyleft-critique
of Rawlsianism). See also Dani Filc, The Liberal Grounding of the Right to Health Care: An
Egalitarian Critique, 112 THEORIA 51 (2007).
82. See, e.g., PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN
JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? (1995). Any health care system that bars supplemental payments or payments
outside that system has the potential for a meaningful equalization of the available medical care,
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A desire for as strict an egalitarianism as is feasible tells us little, however, about
how to address, at the same time, arguable inequalities among young and old, the
healthy and the terminally ill, gender differences, justice and equality between
generations, and the health care needs of those persons severely disabled from
birth whose circumstances can be improved to widely varying degrees.8 3
Prioritarianism, in contrast, does not invariably endorse every possible move
in the direction of greater equality.8 4 Prioritarians point out that it is possible to
increase equality in some respect mainly at a disproportionate cost to persons who
are themselves not especially well off, in some supposedly absolute and non-
comparative sense." Prioritarians thus give some unspecified degree of
preference to the less well off, while avoiding unduly rigid forms of
egalitarianism as well as any forms of utilitarianism.8 6
Sufficientarianism, in contrast, holds in the health care context that what is
morally crucial about distributions is not precisely the contrast between equality
and any degrees of inequality, but between having enough-a genuine
sufficiency-and having too little-an insufficiency." One problem for
sufficientarians, however, concerns how to approach a hypothetical problem in
which an inevitable part of the cost of moving some health care recipients from
barely below sufficiency to barely at sufficiency is the worsening, to one degree
at least in some respects. Of course, these restrictions themselves would not begin to address
inequalities of various sorts as between young and old, or between persons who are variously
severely disabled versus those who are not. For background, see, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST
HEALTH: MEETING NEEDS FAIRLY (1ST ED. 2007); ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES J. CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (7th ed. 2012); ROBERT M. VEATCH, JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT
To HEALTH CARE: AN EGALITARIAN ACCOUNT (T.J. Boll & W.B. Bondeson eds., 1991).
83. See COHEN, supra note 8 1. See also R. George Wright, Can Health Care Law and Policy
Be Guided by Basic Values?: The Crucial Role ofPerfectionist Solidarity, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 971
(2018).
84. See generally Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202 (1997); Derek Parfit,
Another Defense ofthe Priority View, 24 UTILITAS 399 (2012); Richard Norman, Equality, Priority
and Social Justice, 12 RATIO 178 (1999); Michael Weber, Prioritarianism, 9 PHIL. COMPASS 756
(2014).
85. The claim that the "absolute" aspects of someone's circumstances can be disentangled
from the relative or comparative aspects of their circumstances may not be merely mistaken, but
importantly mistaken, especially if values such as community, solidarity, and fraternity are taken
seriously. See FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LnITS To GROWTH 27 (Routledge 2nd ed.1978) (on
"positional" goods and services).
86. See sources cited supra note 84.
87. Among today's leading sufficientarians are Harry Frankfurt and George Sher. See, e.g.,
HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON INEQUALITY (2015); Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98
ETHICS 21 (1987); GEORGE SHER, EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS (2014). Sufficientarians also
tend to rely on a distinction between someone's comparative position, relative to others, and the
goodness or badness of one's circumstances in some absolute sense. See also Ram-Tiktin, supra
note 25.
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or another, of the health care rights of some even worse-off persons."
Closely akin to sufficientarianism is an approach that emphasizes something
like a decent minimum89 of realistic access to health care. This approach, like
prioritarianism and sufficientarianism, inevitably suffers from a certain
vagueness.9 0 The primary concern here, though, is whether a decent minimalism,
especially if construed as requiring less than genuine sufficiency, meets even the
current international law requirements regarding health care rights.9 ' After all,
those requirements have sometimes been ambitiously summarized in terms of
aspiring to the "highest attainable"9 2 standard of health.
Finally, a right to health care might be treated in largely formalist terms, with
proper accounting for the positive and negative externalities associated with one's
health, including the effects of one's own health on the health of non-consenting
third parties.9 3 Whatever their merits, such approaches amount less to
interpretations of a substantive human right to health care than to a denial of such
a right.
88. Such a move, however otherwise morally unattractive, would decrease the number of
persons below sufficiency, while moving no one from the category of sufficient health care to
insufficient health care. See SHLOMI SEGALL, WHY INEQUALITY MATTERS: LUCK EGALITARIANISM,
ITS MEANING AND VALUE (2016) (discussing several approaches).
89. See, e.g., Stephen Nathanson, Equality, Sufficiency, Decency: Three Criteria ofEconomic
Justice, 30 J. PHIL. RES. 367 (2005); see, e.g., Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum
of Health Care, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 55 (1984) (discussing access specifically in the health and
healthcare context); Gary E. Jones, The Right to Health Care and the State, 33 PHIL. Q. 279, 279
(1938) (citing Charles Fried, Equality and Rights to Health Care, 6 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 29
(1976)).
90. In many contexts, vague categories are neither refinable nor dispensable. See generally
TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS ch. 1 (1994).
91. While the right to health is not to be understood as a right to be healthy, the right in
question has been formulated as "the right to the highest attainable standard of health." See Comm.
on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health (Art. 12), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) (discussing Article 12 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (emphasis in the original).
See also International, supra note 1, at 1470 (providing Kinney's thoughts on General Comment
14).
92. See, International, supra note 1, at 1470. Whether this stringent interpretation is
persuasive is considered by, see, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 89, at 56; Raz, supra note 9, at 45
(we should reject the highest attainable standard test if taken to refer to what is factually attainable);
Jonathan Wolff, The Demands ofthe Human Right to Health, 86 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 217,
222 (2012) (citing Onora O'Neill, The Dark Side of Human Rights, 81 INT'L AFF. 427 (2005)).
While all rights require some ranking and prioritization as among themselves, a right to health care
may require, or presuppose, fulfillment of a broad range of partly competing economic and social
rights.
93. For a sophisticated libertarianism, see, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE &UTOPIA
(1974). For skepticism as to demanding forms of a right to health care, see, e.g., Richard D. Lamm,
The Case Against Making Healthcare a "Right," 25 HUM. RTS. 8 (1998).
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One important problem attending fair equality in general and health care
rights in particular, whatever the interpretation, has to do with problems of free,
responsible, voluntary risky choices and bad outcomes. These problems are
addressed in what is called "luck egalitarianism."9 4 While luck egalitarian
concerns apply to a wide range of contexts, they apply with particular force to the
logic of health care rights. Meaningfully pursuing any implications of luck
egalitarianism herein would be impossible.9 5 But to continue the conversation in
which Professor Kinney engages, we need only point to some basic unresolved
problems.
Very roughly, a simple form of luck egalitarianism would notice that some
bad health outcomes seem to have nothing to do with any responsible choices on
the part of the person suffering the bad, and perhaps expensive, health condition.
Being born with a serious and continuing physical disability could fall into this
category. On the other hand, many people would distinguish such cases from
those in which the bad health outcome seems to result from a different kind of
luck, in which the adversely affected party seems to have deliberately, knowingly,
understandingly, voluntarily, freely, and responsibly assumed the risk of precisely
the kind and severity of the bad health outcome that happened to result.
Which activities, if any, fall into the latter category remains controversial.
Perhaps we might think of an undistracted veteran professional skier who falls
and breaks a leg on a well-tended ski run. But how should we classify cases of
familiar sorts of occupational diseases, or addictive cigarette smoking? Many
choices are constrained and conditioned by one's social and economic
circumstances. Even one's apparent capacity for effort and initiative may reflect
the first or non-responsible sort of luck.
A further complication is that some risky behaviors may result in not only
foreseeable kinds and degrees of harms to health, but in much more severe and
more expensive health harms than the actor could reasonably have foreseen. A
luck egalitarian approach to such injuries might or might not subsidize the
treatment of all of the harm in such cases, or at least treatment for the harm
attributable to unforeseeable consequences of the actor's choices. And more
broadly, luck egalitarianism must at some point confront issues of moral hazard9 6
94. The idea of luck egalitarianism was initially associated with its evolving use by Professor
Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Luck and Hierarchy, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
190 (2003). For comprehensive accounts, see SEGALL, supra note 88; Richard Arneson, Rethinking
Luck Egalitarianism and Unacceptable Inequalities, 40 PHIL. ToPics 153 (2012); Nicholas Barry,
Reassessing Luck Egalitarianism, 70 J. Pol. 136 (2008); Marc Fleurbay, Freedom With
Forgiveness, 4 POL., PHIL. & EcON. 29 (2005); Kok-Chor Tan, A Defense ofLuck Egalitarianism,
105 J. PHIL. 665 (2008); Peter Vallentyne, Brute Luck, Option Luck and Equality of Initial
Opportunities, 112 ETHICS 529 (2002). For a concise overview, see Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen,
Justice and Bad Luck, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2005), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/justice-bad-luck [https://perma.cc/8U6A-ZGWD].
95. For a useful start, see sources cited supra note 94.
96. See, e.g., AmY FINKELSTEIN, MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE (2014).
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and of the logic of mercy and solidarity underlying opportunities for
bankruptcy. 9 7
Each of these concerns requires continuing conversation among proponents
and critics of any form of a human right to health care. But there are also
unresolved questions regarding the crucial dependencies of health, and health
care, on a wide range of other rights and statuses, as well as of the international
redistribution of resources that may be required by a human right to health care.
We briefly continue the conversation on these themes below.
IV. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE: INTERDEPENDENCIES WITH OTHER
RIGHTS AND STATUSES AND THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL
RESOURCE REDISTRIBUTION
Among the continuing conversational threads is the relations between health
and the social and economic determinants of health, quite apart from health care
and medical treatments. It has been suggested that public health, and certainly
individual health, is less a function of what we normally classify as health care
than of what we might call the social and economic determinants of health.
Health care by itself obviously does not even approach ensuring one's health. 98
Nor is one's health invariably dependent upon one's personal health care.99
Health tends, plainly, to reflect social advantages and disadvantages along
several axes, including economic class, education, place of residence, race, and
gender.' Some of these social determinants seem to combine the operations of
luck'0 ' with prevailing patterns of broader dominance and subordination.' 0 2
97. See, e.g., Shlomi Segall, In Solidarity with the Imprudent: A Defense of Luck
Egalitarianism, 33 SOCIAL THEORY & PRAC. 177 (2007).
98. See, e.g., Kimberley Brownlee, Do We Have a Human Right to the Political Determinants
ofHealth?, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ch. 28 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds.,
2015); D. Robert MacDougall & Griffm Trotter, Rights and Basic Health Care, 36 J. MED. & PHIL.
529, 531 (2011); Barbara Wilson, Social Determinants ofHealth from a Rights-Based Approach,
in REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, 60 (Andrew Clapham et al. eds., 2009).
99. See sources cited supra note 98. Thus, the familiar adverse selection effect of many
healthy young adults declining to buy health insurance, given their priorities, thereby raising
insurance premiums for others, and perhaps impairing the viability of the health insurance scheme
in question. See, e.g., Timothy J. Layton, Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, Measuring
Efficiency of Health Plan Payment Systems in Managed Competition Health Insurance Markets
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21531, 2015), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w21531.pdf.
100. See, e.g., KATHRYN STROTHER RATCLIFF, THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH:
LOOKING UPSTREAM (2017); DONALD BARR, HEALTH DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: SOCIAL
CLASS, RACE ETHNICITY & HEALTH, (2nd ed. 2014). See also NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH
(2008) (elaborate treatment of health in the context of inequalities of opportunity).
101. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., the authorities cited supra note 100; Jayna Fishman & Douglas Mackay,
Rawlsian Justice and the Social Determinants ofHealth, 36 J. APPLIED PHIL. 608 (2018).
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It is not simply that health, or the lack thereof, affects and is crucially affected
by the other rights and opportunities. Actually, "if other factors matter more to
health than health care, it is not at all evident that it is health care and not those
other determinants [of health] that should be redistributed."'0 3 Perhaps societies
that value health are best advised not to focus, primarily, on health care itself, but
on the crucial social and economic sources of illness, disease, and poor health.10 4
Or put in terms of rights, a right to health care is perhaps best not merely
supplemented by, but subordinated to, a right to fair social and economic
opportunity in other basic respects.o' Dramatically put, it has thus been argued
that "society does more to move its citizens toward their fair share of health when
it devotes the equivalent of the health care budget to improving the social
determinants of health than when it runs a national health care system."'06 Or
more dramatically yet, insofar as the focus is on fair opportunity in advanced
societies, "an equal opportunity account requires that society spend none of its
health budget on health care and all of it on ameliorating the social determinants
[of ill health] instead."'0 7
On such a view, it is thus possible that recognizing and directly fulfilling a
human right to health care may actually lead to a worse distribution of health than
might otherwise be available. Public investments in health care may in practice
not pay off as well as public investments elsewhere, precisely in terms of
improved health.
Of course, the sheer magnitude of the resources available to promote health
matters as well. And the magnitude of resources available to promote health,
directly or indirectly, is of especially vital concern in cases of developing
economies. In a developing country, the meaning of a human right to health care
crucially depends upon whether the pool of available resources is confined
largely to local wealth, or else includes substantial international transfers, of one
sort or another, as well. As a leading contemporary philosopher has put the issue:
Is this right only a right to the standard of health that a person can attain
with locally available and affordable treatment - however meagre that
103. MacDougall & Trotter, supra note 98, at 531.
104. See id.
105. See DANIELS, supra note 100; Fic, supra note 81; Gopal Sreenivasan, Health Care and
Equality of Opportunity, 37 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 27 (2007). For a more skeptical view of the
social determinants argument, see Adina Preda & Kristin Voigt, The Social Determinants of
Health: Why Should We Care?, 15 Am J. BIOETHICS 25 (2015) (changes in wealth and income
inequalities may be only poorly related to health outcomes).
106. Sreenivasan, supra note 105, at 27. We assume here that the incentive effects of both
approaches are equal.
107. See id. (emphasis in the original). Sreenivasan recognizes as well that one's ill health, as
in the case of a congenital disability, may affect one's opportunities to some degree independently
of the society's accommodation thereof.
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me be? Or is it a right to the highest" available globally'0 9 - however
expensive that may be?"0
This question leads to the further question of the most morally persuasive
approach to required public and private wealth transfers from relatively rich to
poor on a global basis."' It may well be that the moral demands of such wealth
distribution are greater than is commonly acknowledged." 2
The conversation regarding the redistributive requirements of a human right
to health care should, clearly, continue. As a final suggestion for the moment,
consider that some global health care problems must be addressed as we are now,
with only our currently available resources, whether those resources are to be
redistributed internationally or not. A current epidemic, for example, must be
addressed largely in the present. That epidemic cannot be put on pause until we
have generated additional resources to devote to prevention and cure.
But in other contexts, the tradeoffs between immediately addressing a health
care problem full on, and instead only mitigating such current harms while also
more rapidly building our collective resources for a more successful longer-term
confrontation, may be dramatic. Generally, effective prevention and cure of major
diseases becomes more feasible as the relevant societies make genuine progress
economically, scientifically, and technologically. 113 With continuing and
compounding genuine economic growth and progress, what seems unrealistic in
the moment may become readily manageable some limited number of years in the
future. Medical care that is currently impossible, or at best heroically demanding,
may become feasible, routine, relatively cheap, and uncontroversially deliverable.
More broadly, it is argued that:
The history of economic growth' 14 indicates that, with some
108. Or if not the "highest," at least some ambitious standard.
109. "Global" might conceivably refer to the attained, or attainable, standard of the single
leading nation-state in this respect, or to something akin to a weighted or unweighted global
average.
110. See Onora O'Neill, The Dark Side ofHuman Rights, 81 INT'L AFF. 427, 429 (2005).
111. From among a substantial literature, see generally GARRETT CULLITY, THE MORAL
DEMANDS OF AFFLUENCE (2004); TI MULGAN, THE DEMANDS OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (2005);
PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996); Richard J.
Arneson, What Do We Owe to Distant Needy Strangers?, in PETER SINGER UNDER FIRE: THE
MORAL ICONOCLAST FACES His CRITICS 267 (Jeffrey A. Schaler ed. 2009); Brad Hooker, The
Demandingness Objection, in THE PROBLEM OF MORAL DEMANDINGNESS ch 8, at 149 (T. Chappell
ed. 2009). Classically and influentially, see Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 229 (1971).
112. See the authorities cited supra note 111.
113. These forms of genuine progress would reflect the broader Enlightenment project of
gradually developing the individual and collective capacities of the human mind. See, e.g., JEAN-
ANTOINE-NICOLAS DE CARITAT, MARQUIS DE CONDORCET 1743-1794, OUTLINES OF AN
HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND 8,237 (ULAN PRESS 2012) (1796).
114. This author seeks sustainable long-term growth, but only in a refined sense of "growth,"
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qualifications, growth alleviates misery, improves happiness and
opportunity, and lengthens lives. Wealthier societies have better living
standards, better medicines, and offer greater personal autonomy, greater
fulfillment, and more sources of fun."'
Similarly, the point has been made that whether we welcome or object to the
direct, indirect, or unintended results of technology, the idea of genuine
technological progress itself seems to open the door to worthy projects." 6
Whatever possibilities technological progress destroys, the idea of genuine
progress refers ultimately refers to reducing mere waste,"' in the sense of gains
in the efficiency with which the inputs needed to make goods and services are
reduced."' The formerly impossible then becomes possible, and even
inexpensive, with the health results then depending partly on our willingness to
redistribute the necessary resources to pay for such care to the less well off.
Of course, the choice to advance medical and other technologies may imply
other, perhaps less appealing effects.1' New technologies of health care may
require the abandonment of privacy.1 20 And if we emphasize unduly that
tomorrow's economic, scientific, and technological progress will make health
care more effective, less expensive, or less burdensome for the donors, we may
then rationalize our unwillingness to redistribute resources to combat serious
health crises today.121
Given the lack of consensus on this among other vital issues, the best
collective choice at the moment would seem to involve continuing the ongoing
as distinct from mere GNP-based statistics.
115. TYLER COWEN, STUBBORN ATTACHMENTS 33 (2018); Cowen in turn cites, e.g., STEVEN
PINKER, ENLIGHTENMENT Now: THE CASE FOR REASON, SCIENCE, HUMANISM, AND PROGRESS ch.
6 (2018) (on health in particular); BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH ch. 4 (2006).
116. See Enrique Martinez-Garcia, Technological Progress is Key to Improving World Living
Standards, 8 FED RES. BANK OF DALLAS 4 (June, 2013) https://www.dallasfed.org/research/
eclett/2013/eli304.cfm [https://perma.cc/G6DV-4N3U].
117. See id. at 1.
118. See id.
119. For a classic discussion, see JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John
Wilkinson trans., Vintage ed. 1984) (1964).
120. For current concerns, see, e.g., Brett Friedman & Jennifer Romig, INSIGHT: Top 5
Privacy and Security Challenges for Adopters of Blockchain Technology in Health Care,
BLOOMBERG L. (July 17, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/insight-
top-5 -privacy-and-security-challenges-for-adopters-of-blockchain-technology-in-health-care
[https://perma.cc/A9UT-QQQT].
121. This question also implicates the problem of choosing an optimal social discount rate,
which might include a rate of zero. For discussion, see COWEN, supra note 115, at ch. 4; Andrew
Caplin & John Leahy, The Social Discount Rate, (The Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper
no. 7983, 2000), www.nber.org/papers/w7983 [https://perma.cc/QME5-KP5Y].
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conversation.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Kinney's largely natural law-basedl2 2 approach to an international
human right to health care is a vital contribution to an ongoing conversation. As
one interlocutor has concluded, those "who complain that we lack adequate
philosophical foundations for the broad range of human rights recognized in
international law are right. Developing such foundations, if possible, is a worthy
task. .. "123
One possible way to usefully continue Professor Kinney's conversational
thread would be to try to take the edge off of the debates over philosophical
justifications,' 2 4 alternative meanings of equality,12 5 and a variety of
redistributional questions 2 6 by emphasizing the appeal of what we might call a
broadened sense of solidarity, community, and of (gender-neutral) fraternity.12 7
Perhaps some of the sharpest conflicts could be mitigated by attending to the role
and value of these values.1 2 8
The thought here is that values such as solidarity are akin to contested notions
of equality, but helpfully refer to much more concretely experienced
relationships. There may well thus be contexts in which solidarity is of greater
consequence, descriptively and normatively, than typically abstract
understandings of equality and inequality.1 29 And part of the real value of equality
122. As elaborated in terms of the development and preservation of basic human functional
capacities. See sources cited supra note 25; NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH 316 (2008) (focusing
in part on "protecting normal functioning").
123. DANIELS, supra note 122, at 314. Perhaps out of a sense of the likely futility of any such
quest, these basic questions are set aside by philosophical pragmatists and others. See, e.g.,
JONATHAN WOLFF, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 19-20 (2012) ("[p]robably the right response
... is ... to acknowledge the limits of philosophical argument and allow the resulting disputes to
be resolved through the development of democratic policies and legal doctrine"). See also Raz,
supra note 55, at 14, 19 (on a "political" conception, "human rights need not be universal or
foundational," or for that matter, "very important"). But see GRIFFIN, supra note 54, at 1. It is not
obvious on what edifying and non-arbitrary grounds a "political" debate over human rights is then
to be conducted. In the absence of any pursuit of genuinely better human right policies, the default
motivator may be not a generous universalism, but perceived group interest.
124. See supra Section II.
125. See supra Section Ill.
126. See supra Section IV.
127. For a more elaborate treatment, see Wright, supra note 83.
128. For a useful conceptual exploration, see ANDREW MASON, COMMUNITY, SOLIDARITY AND
BELONGING: LEVELS OF COMMUNITY AND THEIR NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE (2000).
129. See R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 113 (Unwin ed. 1971) (1951).
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may be in helping to generate relationships of friendship, solidarity, and
community bonds.'3 0 Solidarity may require, for example, a limitation on narrow
self-interest,' 3 ' even to the point of meaningful self-sacrifice.13 2
130. See, e.g., JEAN HAMPTON, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 154 (1997) (referring to Aristotle on
equality and the value of community friendships); Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of
Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 288-89 (1999) (egalitarianism as properly "to create a community in
which people stand in relations of equality to others").
131. See Andraes Eshete, Fraternity, 35 REV. METAPHYSICS 27, 28 (1981); Lawrence Crocker,
Equality, Solidarity, and Rawls'Maximin, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 262, 263 (1977).
132. Consider the possibilities for reciprocal self-sacrifice by both providers and recipients of
expensive end-of-life health care, given the emotional stakes and the alternative uses for such
funding.

